Abstract: Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) propose that volume reaction to a public announcement is proportional to the product of absolute price change at the announcement and a measure of differential precision of predisclosure information across traders. We use ownership by institutions with medium stakes (between 1 to 5 percent of outstanding shares) as a measure of differential information precision, given that these institutional investors, as compared to other institutional and individual investors, are likely to have more precise predisclosure information and are more likely to trade at earnings announcements based on their belief revision about stock value. We examine this proposition in the context of earnings announcements and obtain results consistent with the theory. Tests of the theory by prior studies have yielded somewhat inconclusive results. 
Introduction
, hereafter KV, propose that volume reaction to a public announcement is proportional to absolute price change at the time of the announcement and to a measure of differential precision of predisclosure information across traders.
They argue that when public information is released, traders revise their beliefs, leading to a change in market price. However, better-informed traders revise their beliefs less because the new information is less important to them than to those who are poorly informed. The differential belief revision among traders causes trading amongst them. In this paper, we test the above proposition.
Prior studies have tested KV's proposition but the results have been somewhat inconclusive. Stickle (1991) and Atiase and Bamber (1994) use dispersion in analysts'
forecasts as a measure of differential precision of predisclosure information across traders, but acknowledge that the measure has obvious limitations. It reflects divergent expectations of only a subset of market participants, namely, analysts, and is influenced by the average precision of the analysts' private predisclosure information in addition to their differential precision. Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia (1995) add that the relation between trading volume and forecast dispersion cannot be unambiguously attributed to differential precision of information across traders. Utama and Cready (1997) , hereafter UC, use total institutional ownership as a measure of differential precision, arguing that institutional investors are likely to have more precise predisclosure information than individual investors. They argue that as ownership by institutional investors increases, the cross-sectional variation in precision across traders would first increase and then decrease. For example, at both 0% and 100% ownership by institutional investors there would be minimum cross-sectional variation in informedness across investors. However, UC's results are also not completely consistent with KV's theory.
Moreover, they acknowledge that their results are consistent with an alternative explanation, which we discuss later. In this paper, we address the limitations of prior studies by reexamining KV's theory using a more refined measure of differential precision of predisclosure information across traders. For further validation of the theory, we also examine whether the proposed multiplicative specification of the trading volume model is better at explaining the data as compared to the additive specification that has been commonly used by prior empirical studies on this issue.
The main challenge in testing KV's theory is identifying a measure for difference in the precision of predisclosure information across investors who would trade at earnings announcements consistent with their revision in belief about stock value. The total institutional ownership measure used by UC is innovative, but has the following shortcomings. First, the measure assumes that the level of precision of predisclosure information is the same across all institutional investors. Second, it assumes that all institutional investors will have the same propensity to trade at earnings announcements for a given level of change in their belief revision about stock value. We refine the UC measure to address the above limitations. We consider that institutional investors may differ both in terms of information precision and propensity to trade on their information at earnings announcements. To operationalize this idea we classify institutional investors into three categories: institutional investors with high, medium, and low stakes.
Institutions with high (medium, low) stakes own 5 percent or more (between 1 and 5 percent, less than 1 percent) of the equity of the firm.
1 Given that the cost of information gathering for a stock is fixed, the average cost of information per unit of investment decreases with the amount of total investment (Lev 1988) . Thus, the greater the percentage of a stock that an institution owns, the more likely it is that the institution will gather information on that stock. Consequently, we argue that institutions with medium and high stakes are likely to have greater precision of predisclosure information relative to institutions with low stakes.
We further argue that among institutions with medium and high stakes, those with high stakes are less likely to trade on their information at earnings announcements for the following reason. Institutions with high stakes are likely to be "dedicated owners" (see Potter (1992) , Bushee (1998) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) However, Verrecchia (1982) argues that the more informed class is likely to be more risk tolerant and hence the maximum should be at less than 50%
ownership by the informed class. Thus, the UC result is not completely consistent with KV's theory. On using ownership by institutions with medium stakes rather than ownership by all institutions as a proxy for differential information, we find that maximum trading volume occurs at 40% ownership by institutions with medium stakes.
Thus, our results provide better support to KV's theory.
Another important limitation of the UC study is that the relationship between trading volume and total institutional ownership they document may obtain even though total institutional ownership may not be actually proxying for differential information precision. They acknowledge that institutional ownership could be a proxy for earnings announcement precision because institutional owners are considered as better monitors than individual investors. If that is the case, the quadratic relation between abnormal trading volume and institutional ownership can be attributed to the following explanation. Kim and Verrecchia (1991b) propose that differential precision of predisclosure information first increases and then decreases with earnings announcement precision. Hribar (2003) show that the accruals effect is smaller when ownership by transient institutional owners (as defined by Bushee (1998) ) is large. They do not use total institutional ownership because they argue that only transient owners would actively trade on the accruals related mispricing (Sloan 1996) . However, even though transient owners have a high propensity to trade, they are not likely to be well informed because they tend to own a small percentage of shares outstanding.
3 Thus, to test whether the accruals effect is due to mispricing it might be useful to examine whether or not this effect is smaller for stocks owned largely by institutions with medium stakes.
3 Bushee (1998) shows that dedicated investors and quasi indexers have limited propensity to trade and transient investors have high turnover. However, it seems that the transient investors are unlikely to be informed because on the Block factor they have a negative weight meaning they own a rather small percentage of outstanding shares of a stock providing them insufficient incentives to gather information. The transient investors have a positive weight on the momentum factor suggesting that these investors trade in the direction of the reported change in earnings, but this does not imply that these investors are better at interpreting publicly available information. Also, none of the Bushee's categories can be considered as having investors that have more precise predisclosure information as well as a high propensity to trade. Thus, for explaining abnormal trading volume at earnings announcements, we do not use Bushee's categories.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the KV model on trading volume and UC's simplification of it when there are only two classes of investors with different precision of predisclosure information. Section 3 discusses the operationalization of the model for empirical testing, variable definitions, and data sources. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes the study.
Kim and Verrecchia model
KV propose the following model for volume reaction to a public announcement, UC derive a version of KV's model with traders with two levels of precision of predisclosure information s 1 and s 2 . Let n 1 and n 2 be the number of traders in the two groups and if risk tolerance, r, is the same across all investors, then Equation (1) simplifies to
where c = n 1 /(n 1 + n 2 ). Equation (2) indicates that trading volume at earnings announcements is concave and quadratic in c with a maximum at c = 0.50. The maximum at 50% of institutional ownership obtains because of the assumption of the same level of risk tolerance across all traders. Verrecchia (1982) proposes that risk tolerance is likely to be greater for investors with greater precision of predisclosure information. This implies that institutions with medium stakes are likely to be more risk tolerant than other investors and that they would trade more aggressively on their information. The maximum point should therefore be at below 50% ownership by institutions with medium stakes.
Model specification, variable definitions, and data

Model specification
We use the following model to test KV's proposition,
The dependent variable EXVOL is excess trading volume at earnings announcements.
ADJINSTM stands for adjusted ownership by institutions with medium stakes. It is defined as the shares held by institutions with medium stakes in the stock (1 to 5% of outstanding shares) divided by total shares held by individuals and by institutions with low (less than 1% of outstanding shares) and medium stakes, but not high stakes (greater than 5% of outstanding shares). The variable ADJINSTM represents the term c in equation (2). Note that per the definition of c, we adjust the percentage ownership by institutions with medium stakes to reflect our argument that ownership by institutions with high stakes is likely to be ownership by dedicated investors who are not motivated to trade at earnings announcements, and are therefore not relevant in KV's trading volume model. ARET is the absolute value of excess return at the earnings announcement. As per Equation (2), we predict that a 1 is positive and a 2 is negative.
Results consistent with these predictions would validate KV's proposition.
Next, we introduce several control variables in Equation (3) to rule out the possibility that results from Equation (3) are due to confounding factors. We use the following regression model,
LSIZE is the natural logarithm of the average value of market capitalization during the non-announcement period. The non-announcement period is days -70 to -11 and +11 to +70, where day 0 is the earnings announcement day. LPRICE is the natural logarithm of stock price two days before the earnings announcement. ADVOL is the average daily dollar values of shares (in million) traded during the non-announcement period. BETA is the beta of the stock estimated over the non-announcement period and SRISK is the standard deviation of the market model residuals estimated over the non-announcement period deflated by the standard deviation of market returns during the same period.
In Equation (4), we introduce ADJINSTM, ADJINSTM 2 and ARET as separate variables to capture any main effects associated with these variables. Without these controls, the coefficients on the interaction terms using these variables may provide biased results. Including these variables simultaneously with the interaction terms will also enable the examination of whether trading volume is better explained by a multiplicative specification or an additive specification of the absolute price change at earnings announcements and differential precision of predisclosure information.
The other control variables in Equation (4) have been suggested by prior studies. In examining trading volume at earnings announcements, Bamber (1986 Bamber ( , 1987 , Atiase and Bamber (1994) , and UC use LSIZE as an explanatory variable. The other explanatory variables used in each of these studies differ, accordingly the rationale for using the size variable as well as the predicted sign of its coefficient also differ. In our operationalization of KV's model, size does not factor in. However following prior studies, we include it in the model, but make no prediction on the sign of its coefficient.
Following UC, we include LPRICE and ADVOL to control for the effect of transaction costs on trading volume at earnings announcements. A trader is unlikely to engage in a trade if the benefit from it is less than the transaction costs (Michaely and Villa (1995 and 1996) and Michaely and Murgia (1995) ). LPRICE proxies for the direct transaction costs, bid-ask spread and trading commission, and ADVOL proxies for indirect transaction costs such as price pressure on illiquid stocks (Bhushan (1994) ). We expect LPRICE and ADVOL to be positively related to excess trading volume around earnings announcements.
Michaely and Vila (1996) show that trading volume around ex-dividend days is related to a stock's risk. They argue that the higher the risk, the smaller the position traders are willing to assume since they cannot arbitrage away that risk. Further, they argue that in the absence of transaction costs, trading volume is independent of the market risk component of the stock risk because it can be costlessly hedged away.
However, when transactions are costly, trading volume is a decreasing function of both the market risk component of stock risk and its idiosyncratic component. This argument should also apply in the context of trading volume at earnings announcements. Thus, we expect BETA, the market risk component, and SRISK, the idiosyncratic risk component, to be negatively related to trading volume at earnings announcements.
Data and variable definitions
We follow prior studies (Bamber and Cheon (1995) 
where VOL it,d is the number of shares traded on a given day. We calculate a two-day (days -1 and 0 relative to the earnings announcement date) measure of excess trading volume as,
This measure captures the percentage increase in daily trading volume during the announcement period relative to the non-announcement period.
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We use the absolute value of 2-day (-1 to 0) cumulative abnormal returns, ARET, as our measure of absolute price change. Abnormal returns are estimated using the market model. The parameters of the market model, for each firm-year observation in the sample are estimated over the corresponding 120-day non-announcement period as follows:
where RET it,d is the daily stock return for firm i, year t, and day d belongs to the nonannouncement period (from day -70 to -11 and from day 11 to 70) and MKT t,d is daily value-weighted market return. ARET is computed as
where RET it and MKT t are the 2-day (-1,0) announcement period stock return and market return, respectively.
BETA is the estimate of β from the market model and firm-specific risk SRISK is computed as are defined as entities other than natural persons that have investment discretion over at least $100 million of equity securities. We obtain institutional ownership data for a given year from January CDs of that year given that we have access to only the January CDs.
Our final sample has 9,862 firm-year observations with all required data. Table 3 presents regression estimates of Equation (3). As expected, the coefficient on ADJINSTM×ARET is positive and significant (87.942, t = 35.58) and the coefficient on ADJINSTM 2 ×ARET is negative and significant (-118.875, t = -23.58). These results suggest that as predicted by KV, trading volume at earnings announcement is related to the absolute price change at the time of the announcement and traders' differential precision of predisclosure information. Table 3 also presents regression estimates of Equation (4), which incorporates several control variables. Once again, the coefficient on ADJINSTM×ARET is positive and significant (31.075, t = 6.44) and the coefficient on ADJINSTM 2 ×ARET is negative and significant (-38.636, t = -4.68). Thus, the regression results for Equation (3) are not completely driven by correlated omitted variables. However, the magnitude of these coefficients are substantially smaller than are those for equation (3), emphasizing the importance of using the control variables. These results once again suggest that trading volume at earnings announcements is related to the absolute price change at earnings announcements and traders' differential precision of predisclosure information. Results in table 3 also suggest that for explaining trading volume, the product terms containing ADJINSTM , ADJINSTM 2 , and ARET are better specified than the additive terms of these variables. As previously noted, coefficients on both the product terms, ADJINSTM×ARET and ADJINSTM 2 ×ARET, are significant with predicted signs, but ADJINSTM and ADJINSTM 2 in their additive forms are both insignificant (t = -0.22 and t = 0.40, respectively). The positive and significant coefficient on the additive term ARET (t=16.82) by itself is not sufficient for validating the additive specification. Given that KV's model proposes a multiplicative specification, our results provide further validity to KV's theory.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Regression results
The basic model
The signs of the coefficients on other control variables are generally as expected.
Specifically, the coefficient on LPRICE is positive and significant (0.199, t = 8.06),
suggesting that low price per share stocks have high levels of transaction costs due to bidask spreads and commissions, which make these stocks less attractive to trade. The coefficient on the second proxy for transaction costs, ADVOL, is not significant. 6 The coefficients on BETA and SRISK are negative and significant (-0.086, t = -4.36; -0.024, t = -3.47, respectively), as expected.
We use the regression results of Equation (4) to estimate the value of ADJINSTM at which the trading volume is maximized. On taking the first derivative of equation (4) with respect to ADJINSTM and equating it to zero, we get the maxima when 
The maximum at less than 50% is consistent with higher precision traders (in our case, the medium institutional investors) having higher risk tolerance than low precision traders (Verrecchia (1982)) and consequently being more aggressive in their trades.
Model with ownership by institutions with high, medium, and low stakes
UC use total institutional ownership as a proxy for differential precision across traders. They implicitly assume that institutional owners are homogeneous in terms of precision of their predisclosure information as well as their propensity to trade on their information at earnings announcements. We, on the other hand, argue that institutional owners with small stakes are unlikely to have high precision information because they may not be able to justify costs of gathering information, and institutional owners with high stakes tend to be dedicated investors who are unlikely to trade on their information at earnings announcements. Thus, institutional owners with medium stakes are the ones who possess high precision information and have a high propensity to trade on their information. Hence, we argue that only ownership by institutions with medium stakes responsible for neutralizing the possible positive association between EXVOL and ADVOL due to transaction costs.
should be relevant for explaining trading volume at earnings announcements. To examine this argument we estimate two models which are variations of Equation (4) The signs on these coefficients are consistent with KV's theory as well as the notion that total institutional ownership proxies for differential precision of predisclosure information. However, based on the magnitudes of these coefficients, maximum trading volume (estimated using an approach similar to equation (5)) (1982) proposition that abnormal trading volume is maximized when traders with more precise information own less than 50% of the firm's equity. Thus, the Table 5 results validate our argument for considering different levels (high, medium, and low) of stakes by institutional investors in measuring differential precision of information and differential propensity to trade on earnings information across institutional investors.
The results in Table 5 also allow us to discriminate whether the relation between trading volume and total institutional ownership is because institutional ownership is proxying for differential precision of predisclosure information or earnings announcement precision, a concern raised by UC. Given that our results in Table 5 show that trading volume is related with INSTM but not with INSTH, the earnings announcement precision explanation is unlikely to be valid. It is unlikely that INSTM proxies for precision of earnings announcement but INSTH does not. In fact institutions with high stakes are likely to play a stronger monitoring role causing earnings announcements to be more precise.
Sensitivity to the definitions of high, medium, and low institutional stakes
Given that our cutoffs for classifying institutional ownership stakes as high, medium and low are somewhat arbitrary, we examine the sensitivity of our results to these cutoffs.
Specifically, we break each of the classes further into two groups. INSTH is broken into
INSTHH (greater than 10%) and INSTHL (between 5% and 10%). INSTM is broken into
INSTMH (between 2% and 5%) and INSTML (between 1% and 2%). INSTL is broken into INSTLH (between 0.5% and 1%) and INSTLL (below 0.5%). We then reestimate the model in Table 5 with these additional classes of institutional ownership and report the results in Table 6 . an institution is greater than 0.5%, the institution tends to have more precise information than that of individual traders. Consequently, it may be argued that our low group is not homogeneous and should be accordingly further partitioned. Thus, the assumption we make in this study that investors with more precise predisclosure information and propensity to trade on their information at earnings announcements are institutions with 1% to 5% ownership of the stock needs to be slightly modified. We repeat the analysis in the paper after redefining INSTL, INSTM and INSTH as corresponding to less than 0.5% stake, between 0.5% to 5% stake, and greater than 5% stake, respectively. All of the results remain qualitatively the same.
Comparison with the UC model
We modify the UC analysis in two main ways. We do not consider all institutional owners to be homogeneous and we use a multiplicative specification as against their 
Conclusion
Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) propose that volume reaction to a public announcement is proportional to the product of absolute price change at the announcement and a measure of differential precision of predisclosure information across traders. We use ownership by institutions with medium stakes (between 1% to 5% of outstanding shares)
as a measure of differential information precision, given that these institutional investors, as compared to other investors, are likely to have more precise predisclosure information and are more likely to trade at earnings announcements based on their belief revision about stock value. We examine this proposition in the context of earnings announcements and obtain results consistent with the theory.
We argue that institutional investors with low stakes cannot justify costs of obtaining information; and institutions with high stakes are likely to have relatively precise information but they tend to be dedicated investors holding long-term positions in a firm's stock and thus are unlikely to trade at earnings announcements as per their belief revision about stock value. Accordingly, we find that abnormal trading volume at earnings announcements is related to ownership by institutions with medium stakes but is not related to ownership by institutions with low or high stakes.
Our finding that precision of information and propensity to trade on information differ across institutions with different stake levels also has implications for studies other than those on trading volume. A number of recent studies use total institutional ownership to identify a class of investors that have more precise predisclosure information about forthcoming earnings (e.g., Jiambalvo et al. 2002) or that are better at interpreting public information and consequently prevent systematic mispricing of stocks (Bartov et al. 2000) . We believe that in such studies classification of institutional investors similar to ours would be useful in getting a better measure for investor class with the characteristic that the researcher is interested in. EXVOL is daily trading volume over the 2-day earnings announcement period (-1,0) divided by normal trading volume minus 1, where normal trading volume is calculated during the non announcement period (days -70 to -11 and 11 to 70). ADJINSTM is the percentage of shares held during the announcement period by institutions with medium stakes in the stock (1 to 5%) divided by total shares held by individuals and by institutions with low (less than 1%) and medium stakes (1 to 5%). ARET is the absolute value of the abnormal returns during the announcement period. SIZE is the average market capitalization over the nonannouncement period. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of SIZE. PRICE is stock price on day -2 relative to the announcement date. LPRICE is the natural logarithm of PRICE. ADVOL is the average daily dollar value (in millions) of shares traded during the non-announcement period. BETA is estimated using the market model over the 120-day non-announcement period. SRISK is the standard deviation of the error term from the market model estimated over the non-announcement period deflated by the standard deviation of market returns over the market model estimation period. EXVOL is daily trading volume over the 2-day earnings announcement period (-1,0) divided by normal trading volume minus 1, where normal trading volume is calculated during the non announcement period (days -70 to -11 and 11 to 70). ADJINSTM is the percentage of shares held during the announcement period by institutions with medium stakes in the stock (1 to 5%) divided by total shares held by individuals and by institutions with low (less than 1%) and medium stakes (1 to 5%). ARET is the absolute value of the abnormal returns during the announcement period. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of average market capitalization over the non-announcement period. LPRICE is the natural logarithm of stock price on day -2 relative to the announcement date. ADVOL is the average daily dollar value (in millions) of shares traded during the non-announcement period. BETA is estimated using the market model over the 120-day non-announcement period. SRISK is the standard deviation of the error term from the market model estimated over the non-announcement period deflated by the standard deviation of market returns over the market model estimation period. *** (**, *) represents significance level at 1% (5%, 10%). EXVOL is daily trading volume over the 2-day earnings announcement period (-1,0) divided by normal trading volume minus 1, where normal trading volume is calculated during the non announcement period (days -70 to -11 and 11 to 70). ADJINSTM is the percentage of shares held during the announcement period by institutions with medium stakes in the stock (1 to 5%) divided by total shares held by individuals and by institutions with low (less than 1%) and medium stakes (1 to 5%). ARET is the absolute value of the abnormal returns during the announcement period. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of average market capitalization over the non-announcement period. LPRICE is the natural logarithm of stock price on day -2 relative to the announcement date. ADVOL is the average daily dollar value (in millions) of shares traded during the non-announcement period. BETA is estimated using the market model over the 120-day non-announcement period. SRISK is the standard deviation of the error term from the market model estimated over the non-announcement period deflated by the standard deviation of market returns over the market model estimation period. *** (**, *) represents significance level at 1% (5%, 10%). EXVOL is daily trading volume over the 2-day earnings announcement period (-1,0) divided by normal trading volume minus 1, where normal trading volume is calculated during the non announcement period (days -70 to -11 and 11 to 70). INST is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors during the announcement period. INSTH is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors that own more than a 5% stake. INSTM is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors that own a stake of between 1% and 5%. INSTL is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors that own less than a 1% stake. ARET is the absolute value of the abnormal returns during the announcement period. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of average market capitalization over the non-announcement period. LPRICE is the natural logarithm of stock price on day -2 relative to the announcement date. ADVOL is the average daily dollar value (in millions) of shares traded during the nonannouncement period. BETA is estimated using the market model over the 120-day non-announcement period. SRISK is the standard deviation of the error term from the market model estimated over the non-announcement period deflated by the standard deviation of market returns over the market model estimation period. *** (**, *) represents significance level at 1% (5%, 10%). 
